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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) and (j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its application of relevant precedent

to the facts of this case.
2.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining to consider Petitioners'

discussion of Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), and Smith v.
Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004), in their reply brief on appeal and in treating similar
contentions as not being raised in their initial brief.
"On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision of the court of appeals, not
the decision of the district court." Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12,1} 9, 179 P.3d 775;
See also, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n, 2006 UT 58, ^f 8, 147
P.3d 1189; Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ^ 8, 27 P.3d 538. "The correctness of the court
of appeals' decision turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's
decision under the appropriate standard of review." Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^j 9; Clark, 2001
UT 44, ]f 8. Review in certiorari is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the
questions presented for review. Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856
(Utah 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes directly applicable to the legal
issues present in this matter.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute regarding the sale of a vacant, undeveloped lot from
Country Living Development, LLC, ("Country Living Development") to David and
Kristine Anderson ("the Andersons"). Matthew Kriser acted as agent for Country Living
Development and facilitated the sale. After the sale, the Andersons engaged David's
father, Norman Anderson, a licensed contractor, to build a home on the lot they had
purchased. Some years after Norman Anderson built the home, David and Kristine noted
cracks in the foundation caused by settling in the soil. The Anderson's thereafter brought
suit against Matthew Kriser personally, alleging fraudulent nondisclosure of collapsible
soils. The Andersons did not bring suit against Country Living Development, LLC, nor
against Norman Anderson.
At the time of the transaction that forms the basis of this action, Defendant and
Appellee Matthew Kriser was an employee and shareholder of Country Living
Development, LLC. (Record p. 139-40). Country Living Development was engaged in
developing real estate in the Aspen Cove real estate development in Pleasant Grove,
Utah. (Record p. 108). As an employee of Country Living Development, Matthew
Kriser's responsibilities were to oversee the sales and marketing of land held by Country
Living Development. (Record p. 108, 139-40). Drew Kriser was also an employee and
shareholder of Country Living Development.

(Record p. 108).

Drew's primary

responsibilities were to oversee the subdivision approvals and compliance with municipal
regulatory requirements for development projects. Id. In 1997, in compliance with the
regulatory requirements of Pleasant Grove, Country Living Development, engaged
-2-

Earthtec Inc., a geotechnical and soils testing firm, to perform soils tests for the Aspen
Cove development. (Record p. 105, 139-40). The Earthtec soils report indicated that
some portions of the Aspen Cove development contained mild to moderate collapsible
soils that would require compaction before building. (Record p. 110-37). The report
does not say that any of the subdivision was unsuitable for building. Id. Mr. Kriser does
not take issue with the Andersons recital of the contents of the report. The report speaks
for itself. In compliance with local ordinance, the Earthtec soils report was filed with the
city of Pleasant Grove for public inspection.

(Record p. 105; Record p. 96). It is

undisputed that up until the Andersons filed suit against him personally, Matthew Kriser
never saw the report nor did he have knowledge of its contents. (Record p. 105, 139140).
In 1998, the Andersons approached Country Living Development, through
Matthew Kriser, and expressed interest in purchasing a vacant lot in the Aspen Cove
development. (Record p. 108, 139-140). At the beginning of the transaction, Mr. Kriser
signed, as agent for Country Living Development, an offer to purchase. (Record p. 224).
The sale transaction culminated in the Andersons purchasing a residential lot from
Country Living Development. (Record p. 108, 259). The warranty deed specifically
designates Country Living Development, LLC, as the seller. (Record p. 259). Matthew
Kriser signed the deed as "manager" of Country Living Development, LLC. Id.
In 1998, prior to and during the sale to the Andersons, Matthew Kriser understood
that cities regularly require soils tests to be performed as part of the process of approving
the road development within a subdivision, but did not know whether one had in fact
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been performed for the Aspen Cove development. (Record p. 105, 139-40). Moreover,
at the time of the sale to the Plaintiffs, Matthew Kriser did not understand or know that
the Aspen Cove soils test made any recommendations for construction regarding
residential lots in the Aspen Cove development. Id. Matthew Kriser did not see the
Earthtec soils report prior to the sale to the Plaintiffs. Id. There are no disputes of fact in
regards to Mr. Kriser's knowledge at the time of the sale to the Andersons. In 2007, Mr.
Kriser indicated to the Andersons that he had reviewed the contents of Earthtec report
after this suit had been filed. (Record p. 193).
After purchasing the property in question, the Andersons employed David's father,
Norman Anderson as the general contractor and builder of their home located on the
property in question. (Record p. 96). Prior to building the Andersons' home, Norman
Anderson had built five other homes. (Record p. 99). Norman Anderson failed to check
with Pleasant Grove City concerning any soils testing that had been done for the Aspen
Cove development and therefore failed to discover the Earthtec soils test report. (Record
p. 96). Norman Anderson failed to compact the soils underlying the footings for the
Andersons home. (Record p. 99, 103). Norman Anderson failed to compact the soils that
were used to fill around the basement walls, after the footings, foundation, and basement
walls were formed. Id. Some years later the Andersons discovered settling in the soil
underlying and surrounding their home and developing cracks in the foundation and
basement walls.

Thereafter the Andersons brought suit against Matthew Kriser

personally, alleging he had fraudulently failed to disclose the existence of the soils report

-4-

or that the soils report indicated that some areas of the subdivision had some collapsible
soils.
After the completion of discovery in the case, Matthew Kriser filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, arguing that the undisputed evidence showed (1) that the Andersons
had failed to produce any evidence that he had knowledge of the contents and
recommendations of the soils report, an essential element in any fraudulent nondisclosure cause of action, (2) that in arranging the sale, Mr. Kriser had acted as agent for
Country Living Development and could not be held personally liable, and (3) that Mr.
Kriser personally had no duty to disclose the soils report because he does not qualify as
the builder-contractor as defined by Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, and
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283, especially since Norman
Anderson had built the home and failed to build it in compliance with the
recommendations of the soils report. (Record p. 96, 99, 103). Based on this undisputed
evidence the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Matthew Kriser and made
the finding that there was no evidence that Mr. Kriser had knowledge of the contents of
the soils report. Thus, the Andersons' representations that Mr. Kriser had knowledge of
the report are false. Mr. Kriser had knowledge that a report would normally have been
ordered for a development. (Record p. 105, 139-40). Mr. Kriser had no knowledge that
one had been ordered for the Aspen Cove development, and he absolutely had no
knowledge of the contents of any report. (Record p. 105, 139-40). This is an undisputed
fact.
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In response to the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Andersons took an
appeal and the matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. After briefing, the
Utah Court of Appeals issued a decision upholding the ruling of the trial court. Anderson
v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, (unpublished opinion, see Addendum A to Petitioners'
Brief). This Court granted certiorari to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in its
application of precedent to the facts of this case, and whether the Court of Appeals erred
in declining to consider the Petitioners' discussion regarding the imputation of
knowledge upon real estate developers.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In making their arguments in favor of overturning the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Andersons conveniently omit two dispositive facts: (1) Mr. Kriser was not
the developer of the Andersons' vacant lot, and (2) the Andersons, not Mr. Kriser, hired a
relative and directed the construction of their own home.
The Andersons brought a single cause of action for fraudulent concealment against
Matthew Kriser. "The three elements of fraudulent concealment are best described in this
order: (1) there is a legal duty to communicate information, (2) the nondisclosed
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) the nondisclosed
information is material." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, ^ 35, 143 P.3d
283. Before the Court of Appeals, the parties briefed the two issues upon which the trial
court based its decision: (1) whether Mr. Kriser had a duty to disclose information and (2)
whether Mr. Kriser had knowledge of the information that was allegedly not disclosed.
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The trial court did not reach the question of whether the information was material, and
neither the Court of Appeals nor the parties have addressed it here.
Whether Mr. Kriser has a duty to disclose depends upon his relationship to the
Andersons. If he is the builder-contractor in relation to the Andersons, then he has a duty
to disclose. Similarly, if he is the developer of the Andersons' property then he would
have a similar duty to disclose knowledge that he possesses, if the Andersons had
requested such information.
Whether Mr. Kriser had actual knowledge of the existence and contents of the
report is undisputed. He had no such knowledge. The factual record on this issue is
unequivocal.

However, the Andersons assert that knowledge of the existence and

contents of the soils report can be imputed upon Mr. Kriser because, they allege, he was
the developer of the Anderson's property. Although it is clear from the case law that a
builder-contractor may have knowledge imputed upon him under certain specific
circumstances, it is not clear that such knowledge may also be imputed to the developer.
Loveland v. Orem City Corp,, 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987). This is especially true
when the relationship between developer and purchaser is interrupted by the presence of
an actual builder-contractor who negligently built the Andersons'' home.

Smith v.

Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, ^ 21, 94 P.3d 919. The Court of Appeals, in handling these
questions, addressed the matter by treating Mr. Kriser as a developer in relation to the
Andersons, without analysis, and thereby did not address the question of whether Mr.
Kriser owed the Andersons a duty of disclosure. Rather, the Court of Appeals assumed
this issue without deciding it, because it found the question of knowledge dispositive.
-7-

Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, note 1. The Court of Appeals determined that
Mr. Kriser did not have actual knowledge of the existence or the contents of the soils
report, and also determined that the failures of the builder-contractor intervened to sever
any liability on the part of the developer. Id. The Court of Appeals did not address the
question of whether knowledge could be imputed upon the developer, and held that the
Andersons only raised this issue in their reply brief, thereby making it inappropriate for
the Court of Appeals to address. Id.
This Court has granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals was
correct in its disposition of the case, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing
to address the question of whether knowledge can be imputed upon a developer.
The case law is ambiguous about whether such knowledge can be imputed upon a
developer. Under the facts of this case, such knowledge cannot be imputed because of
the existence of an intervening builder-contractor.

Moreover, although the Court of

Appeals assumed without deciding that Mr. Kriser, not Country Living Development,
LLC, was the developer of the Andersons' property, the factual record indisputably
establishes that he was not the developer of the Andersons' property, and therefore had
no duty of disclosure. In approaching these issues, the question of whether Mr. Kriser
had a duty to disclose and whether he is the developer will be addressed first. Second,
the question of knowledge and imputation of knowledge will be addressed. Finally, the
matter of the intervening negligence of the builder-contractor, along with the actual
disclosure of the soils report to the builder-contractor will be addressed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

MR. KRISER HAD NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE SOILS REPORT
TO THE ANDERSONS BECAUSE HE IS NOT THE DEVELOPER
OF THE ANDERSON'S PROPERTY.

In fraudulent nondisclosure cases, the duty to disclose can arise through several
mediums. The definitive case on the duty to disclose is First Security Bank of Utah v.
Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1990).

A full analysis under

Banberry is not necessary in this matter because other cases have already established that
a duty to disclose exists under certain important contractual relationships. This duty to
disclose is in contravention of the doctrine of caveat emptor in cases where the allegedly
non-disclosing party has superior knowledge and expertise concerning the matter, and
where the information is not easily discovered. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, fflf
25-26, 48 P.3d 235. In cases of collapsible soils on residential lots, appellate courts have
already determined that certain parties owe a duty to disclose the soil conditions. Thus, a
builder-contractor of a home has a duty to disclose any negative soils conditions. Smith,
2004 UT 55, fflf 20-21. Similarly, a developer has a duty to disclose conditions which
make a lot unsuitable for residential building.1 Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769; Yazd, 2006

1

Because of superior knowledge and expertise of the builder-contractor, the courts have
gone so far as to impute knowledge of collapsible soils conditions upon the buildercontractor, and require that such information be disclosed, regardless of whether it is
actually known or not. The rationale behind this is that the expertise and professional
duty of care of the builder-contractor requires him to discover this information before
beginning construction, and because the builder-contractor should know this information,
he is also required to disclose it to the homeowner. Smith, 2004 UT 55,ffl[20-21. The
Andersons now seek to extend this rule to developers. This issue will be addressed in a
separate section below.
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UT 47, ^| 24. It is not clear from the cases that a developer has an automatic duty to
disclose a soils report when the report does not say that the land is 'unsuitable' but only
says that some remedial measures must be taken when constructing a residential building.
Id.

In fact, the cases indicate that such information need only be disclosed "upon

inquiry". Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769. Finally, a seller with actual knowledge of defects
in the property which are not easily discovered by inspection must be disclosed to a
buyer. Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, \ 25.
In the present case, Mr. Kriser does not qualify as a builder-contractor. There is
no factual dispute on this point. Mr. Kriser did not build the home and did not contract
for any work to be done on the property.

Mr. Kriser never owned the property in

question. Mr. Kriser, acting as agent for Country Living Development, LLC, signed the
deed conveying the vacant lot from Country Living to the Andersons. (Record p. 108,
259). Neither Mr. Kriser, nor his principal Country Living, ever built or constructed the
home which forms the subject matter of this action.
Similarly, Mr. Kriser is not the seller of the property. The deed clearly indicates
that Country Living Development, LLC is the seller. (Record p. 108, 259). Mr. Kriser
acted as agent and manager of Country Living in that transaction. Id, Moreover, it is an
undisputed fact that even if Mr. Kriser were the seller, he had no actual knowledge of the
defect.
As to the issue of whether Mr. Kriser was the developer of the property in
question, the facts and law are similarly clear. Mr. Kriser was not the developer of the
property. Country Living Development, LLC, Mr. Kriser's employer, was the developer
- 10-

of the property and Mr. Kriser acted merely as employee and agent for Country Living
Development in the transaction. As to the agency status of Mr. Kriser, the undisputed
facts are as follows:

that at the time of sale to the Andersons, Mr. Kriser was an

employee and shareholder of Country Living Development, LLC; that Country Living
Development, LLC, was developing the Aspen Cove subdivision, where the subject
property is located; that Mr. Kriser's primary responsibilities in working for Country
Living Development, LLC, were to manage the marketing and sales of Aspen Cove
development properties; that the Andersons bought the subject property in the Aspen
Cove development; that the warranty deed for the subject property to the Andersons lists
Country Living Development, LLC, as seller; and that Mr. Kriser signed the seller's
signature line as "manager" on the warranty deed. It is clear that Mr. Kriser was acting
as an agent, was not the actual developer, and that his agency status protects him from
personal liability. An agent is not personally liable for acts undertaken on behalf of a
principal. Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176, 177 (Utah 1961); see also, Wardley Better
Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ffif 19-20, 63 P.3d 1009. "If a contract is
made with a known agent acting within the scope of his authority for a disclosed
principal, contract is that of the principal alone and the agent cannot be held liable."
Carlie v. Morgan, 966 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Taking all of the
undisputed facts together, it is clear that Mr. Kriser was the agent for Country Living

2

If the Andersons had brought their claim against Country Living Development, LLC,
rather than Mr. Kriser personally, the analysis of the liability of a developer may very
well be different.
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Development and that Country Living Development, not Mr. Kriser, was the developer of
the property.
The Andersons make much of the fact that in the opening questions of his
deposition, Mr. Kriser described his occupation as a "builder-developer". (Record, p.
204). The Andersons have latched on to this statement as somehow conclusive of the
proposition that Mr. Kriser was the developer of the Andersons' property. This assertion
is false and misleading. Mr. Kriser has long been employed by various development
companies, and consequently, as a lay-person, he described his occupation as a builder
and developer of real estate. Such an occupational self description is very different from
an admission to a legal term of art that Mr. Kriser was in fact the developer of the
Andersons' property. The surrounding facts, as articulated above, demonstrate that Mr.
Kriser was not the developer of the Andersons' property. The Andersons' attempt to
capitalize on Mr. Kriser's lay description of his occupation as an admission that he is the
legally defined developer of the Andersons' property is misleading and inappropriate.
Country Living Development, LLC, not Mr. Kriser, is the developer of the Andersons'
property.
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Kriser was the developer of the Andersons
property, Utah case law does not impose upon Mr. Kriser an automatic duty to disclose a
soils report which only indicates that in some areas of the subdivision some soils
compaction may be required before building. Loveland states that a developer "has a
duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for
construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house and he must disclose to
-12-

his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the
subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building." 746 P.2d at 769 (emphasis
altered). More importantly, Loveland goes on to explain that a developer "has a further
duty to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has developed in the course of the
subdivision process which is relevant to suitability of the land for its expected use." Id.
(emphasis added). The plain reading of this language in Loveland is that a developer has
an absolute duty to disclose information which he knows or ought to know make the
property unsuitable for residential building.

However, if the information he has

discovered does not make the land unsuitable for residential building but rather is only
"relevant to the suitability of the land for its expected use" then such information need
only be disclosed "upon inquiry".
In the present case, it is undisputed that the soils report does not indicate that the
property is unsuitable for residential building, but only indicates that throughout the
subdivision there were some areas of collapsible soils requiring compaction prior to
building. Indeed, the Aspen Cove Subdivision is now fully developed with houses. The
land was not and is not "unsuitable for such residential building". The Andersons' home
is the only home in the subdivision that has developed settling and cracking in the
foundation, and this is because Norman Anderson, Mr. Anderson's father, failed to obtain
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the soils report from the city when the building permit was issued, and failed to compact
the soils.3
Furthermore, it is also undisputed that neither the Andersons, nor the buildercontractor Norman Anderson, ever made an inquiry to Mr. Kriser or Country Living
regarding the condition of the soils, or a soils report.

Loveland, upon which the

Andersons rely so heavily, specifically states that a developer need only disclose
information "relevant to the suitability of the land for its expected use" "upon inquiry".
746 P.2d at 769. There is no evidence in the record that such inquiry was made, and in
fact it was not made. Consequently, even assuming that Mr. Kriser was the developer of
the Anderson's property, there was no duty to disclose the soils report unless the
Andersons' had inquired about soil conditions, which they did not do.

II.

MR. KRISER HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOILS REPORT
AND SUCH KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE IMPUTED UPON HIM.

The second element for making out a fraudulent concealment case is to show that
at the time of the transaction, the defendant had knowledge of the information in question
and failed to disclose it. Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, ^f 24. The burden for proving this
knowledge rests with the plaintiff. Id. "Fraudulent concealment. . . requires the seller to
have acted "knowingly and recklessly." Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, ]f 36 n. 12,
158P.3d562

3

The effects of this failure and its legal consequences to this case are addressed in a
separate section below.
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In Fennell v. Green, a fraudulent concealment case, failure by the plaintiff to show
that the seller had knowledge of the defects shown in a soils study necessarily meant that
there could have been no duty on the part of the seller, and therefore was fatal to a
buyer's claim for fraudulent non-disclosure. 2003 UT App 291, ^ 12, 77 P.3d 339.
Similarly, the Andersons had to show that at the time of the transaction Mr. Kriser had
knowledge of the contents of the soils study and failed to disclose it.

See e.g.,

Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, ][ 24. The burden for proving this knowledge rests with the
Andersons. Id. All the evidence shows that, at the time of the sale to the Andersons, Mr.
Kriser had no knowledge that any soils test for the development existed or that it made
any recommendations regarding the construction of homes in the subdivision. (Record p.
105, 139-40). There is no evidence which contradicts these statements. The Andersons
sought to offer evidence concerning Mr. Kriser's knowledge in 2007, after the lawsuit
was filed, as if it were evidence of his knowledge in 1998 when the sale occurred. The
Andersons state that after this lawsuit was filed in April of 2007, Mr. Kriser visited the
Andersons in their home and mentioned that he had reviewed the soils study after suit
was filed and that the soils study showed a test pit in the front of their property. (Record
p. 193). The Court of Appeals recognized that this statement is irrelevant. Anderson,
2009 UT App 319, \ 5. Mr. Kriser's knowledge of the soils study in 2007 has no
relevance to his knowledge of the contents of the report in 1998, the time of the sale to
the Andersons. Because there is no evidence to support the knowledge element for a
cause of action of fraudulent concealment, the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming
the decision of the trial court.
-15-

In spite of the Mr. Kriser's indisputable lack of knowledge of the soils report, the
Andersons argue that such knowledge could be imputed upon Mr. Kriser because he was
the developer of the Andersons' property. This argument was raised for the first time in
the Andersons' reply brief before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was
correct in declining to address this argument, and moreover, this argument fails on the
merits.
The Court of Appeals correctly declined to address this argument because the
Andersons raised it for the first time in their reply brief. The Andersons make much ado
about the fact that they quoted language from Yazd in their opening brief and cited the
same language from Loveland in their reply brief, and that the Court of Appeals mistook
this change to mean that the argument had not been briefed previously.

Not so.

Although it is correct that the Andersons quoted a portion of Yazd which might be used to
support an argument in favor of imputation of knowledge on a developer, the fact is that
the Andersons did not use this language in support of such an argument. Rather, the
Andersons used the quote for the proposition that Mr. Kriser had the expertise of a
developer and therefore there is no way he could not have known of the report. The
Andersons argued that Mr. Kriser "must have known that a soils report had been done."
(See Appellants' Brief to the Court of Appeals, pages 12-13). This is different from the
argument that knowledge which Mr. Kriser did not have should nevertheless be imputed
upon Mr. Kriser as a developer. That argument was first articulated in the Andersons'
reply brief. (See Appellants' Reply Brief to the Court of Appeals, pages 5-7). Quoting a
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particular case is not the same as linking that case to a legal argument. Thus, the Court of
Appeals was correct in declining to address it.
In addition, the Court of Appeals was correct in declining to address the argument
because it was not preserved in the trial court below. A simple review of the record
confirms this to be true. The Andersons never raised the argument in any of the briefing
before the trial court. Consequently, even if the arguments of the Andersons in their
opening brief can be construed to include an argument for the imputation of knowledge
upon developers, such argument was not preserved before the trial court, and any error on
the part of the Court of Appeals in refusing to consider it was harmless. The same result
would have been reached because the Andersons never raised that argument before the
trial court.
On the merits, the Andersons' argument for imputation of knowledge against Mr.
Kriser fails, first because Mr. Kriser is not the Andersons' developer, as articulated
above, and second, because neither case law nor public policy supports an extension of
the rule imputing knowledge upon developers.
Utah law imputes the knowledge of soil conditions upon a builder-contractor.
Smith, 2004 UT 55,fflf20-21. The reasons for this imputation of knowledge are based on
the practicalities of homebuilding and are founded in good public policy. In building a
home, a contractor is under a duty to construct the home in accordance with the regular
standard of care required by his profession.

The builder-contractor necessarily is

involved in the excavation, design, and construction of the improvements on the soils he
encounters during the construction process. The standard of care requires that a builder
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know whether the home he is planning on building will be subject to foundation shifts
and collapsible soils.

Hence, in order to not negligently build a home, a builder-

contractor must know of the soils conditions. Because a builder-contractor is required by
his own professional standard of care to know of the soils conditions of the land on which
he is building a home, it is fair and proper for the builder-contractor to be required to
disclose such knowledge to the homeowner. Consequently, even if a builder-contractor
has no such actual knowledge, he is presumed to have such knowledge because his
profession requires it.

Smith v. Frandsen, outlines this reasoning by stating that a

builder-contractor owes "independent duties" which support the imposition of knowledge
and that a builder-contractor's "knowledge and expertise" in his profession gave the
builder-contractor the "'adequate time and opportunity' to discover the subsurface defects
in the property in question." 2004 UT 55, ^f 21. Thus, builder-contractors can have the
knowledge of soils conditions imputed upon them.
The same principles do not apply to a developer.

A developer of property

prepares property for subdivision, building, and economic development. A developer
does not and cannot predict or know the purpose to which subsequent purchasers will put
the property. Although residential construction was contemplated in this particular case,
creating a rule imposing knowledge upon all developers would create a rule which is too
broad and too blunt. Many developers do not know the purposes for which the property
is to be developed or the particular size, configuration or planned construction techniques
for the improvements that may be constructed on the property. A better and more precise
rule is the one already present in Utah, which is best articulated in Loveland. This is that
-18-

a developer is under a duty to disclose information which he knows or ought to know that
reveals that a property is unsuitable for the residential building, when such residential
building is contemplated by the subdivision. 746 P.2d at 769. If there is information
available that is relevant to the suitability of the land for its expected use, then that
information should be disclosed upon inquiry. Id. The Andersons ask this Court to
create a new rule of law imposing knowledge of soils reports on all developers and
mandating disclosure of the reports regardless of their contents or recommendations. The
reason the Andersons must assert this new rule is because the Andersons' cause of action
fails under existing case law. Rather than change the law, as the Andersons request, this
Court should follow it's prior decisions in Loveland, Smith, and Yazd.
The Andersons seek to emphasize the language in Loveland which states that a
developer must disclose information that he "knows or reasonably ought to know makes
the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building." 746 P.2d at 769. This
statement does support the proposition that some knowledge of information can be
imputed upon a developer.

Knowledge of information making the land completely

unsuitable for residential building may be imputed upon a developer.4

However, as

stated before, this imputation of knowledge is limited to the scenario where the
information makes the lots completely unsuitable for residential building. Such is not the
case here. The lots of the Aspen Cove Subdivision are residential with residential homes

4

More importantly, since Country Living Development, LLC, and not Mr. Kriser, was
the actual developer of the Andersons' property, this case does not present sufficient
factual basis for the Court to define the scope of a developer's duty to a buyer of a lot.
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built on them. The information here did not make the homes unsuitable for residential
building. Consequently, this phrase implying some imputation of knowledge does not
have application to the facts of this case.
Finally, it is important to reemphasize that Mr. Kriser is not the developer of the
Andersons' property, and as such, no knowledge can be imputed upon him personally.
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the ruling of the trial court.
III.

THE SOILS REPORT WAS DISCLOSED TO THE BUILDER OF
THE ANDERSONS' HOME AND THE BUILDER-CONTRACTOR'S
NEGLIGENCE SEVERS MR. KRISER'S ALLEGED LIABILITY.

Finally, as the Court of Appeals correctly determined, the failures of the actual
builder of the Andersons' home sever any liability against Mr. Kriser, or any developer.
Norman Anderson, Mr. Anderson's father, built the Andersons' home. (Record, p. 96).
Norman Anderson had relatively little experience building homes, and had only built five
homes prior to this one. (Record, p. 99).
In Smith v. Frandsen, a fraudulent concealment action regarding allegations of a
failure to disclose soils tests, this Court held that, "as a matter of law," a reasonably
prudent builder-contractor should have the expertise to investigate and discover
insufficient compaction on the lot on which he is building, regardless of any lack of
experience. 2004 UT 55, ^ 20. Thus, the duty of a builder-contractor to ensure adequate
compaction, including inquiry at city offices regarding soils tests filed with the city for
public inspection, is a legal, not a factual question. If the builder-contractor has failed to
check with the city, has failed to obtain a soils test, and has failed to ensure adequate
compaction, then, as a matter of law, he has been derelict in his duty. Id.
-20-

The failure of a builder-contractor to ensure adequate compaction, obtain a soils
test, or review the soils report filed with the city, severs the duties and potential liability
of previous owners.
Where a developer conveys property to a residential
contractor, the knowledge and expertise of the builder, and
the independent duties owed thereby, interrupt certain
obligations running from the initial developer to subsequent
purchasers. In other words, borrowing from the language of
the Restatement, we find that conveying to one having
"adequate time and opportunity" to discover the subsurface
defects in [the property in question], [the defendant] incurred
no liability to remote purchasers of the property as a matter of
law.
Id. at Tf 21 (citation omitted).
In the present case, Norman Anderson, the builder-contractor, failed to ensure that
adequate compaction occurred. He did not check with the city for the soils test that had
been filed there. (Record p. 96). He did not compact the ground around the footings, the
foundation, and the basement walls. (Record p. 99, 103). This failure is the proximate
cause for the Plaintiffs' alleged cracking and foundation problems in their home.
According to Smith, Norman Anderson's failure to check for the publicly filed soils
report severs any liability to previous owners or developers. While the facts of this case
differ somewhat from the facts of Smith, since the lot was conveyed by the developer to
the homeowner, who contracted with a builder for the construction of the home, that
difference is not significant to the principle espoused. That is, the independent duties of a
residential contractor interrupt certain obligations running from the initial developer.
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Furthermore, Utah law indicates that filing the soils report with the city and
making it available for public inspection is a factor that a court can consider when
determining whether the seller filled his duty to the buyer to disclose material defects.
Fennell, 2003 UT App 291, \ 2.

Country Living Development, LLC, satisfied its

disclosure duties, the builder-contractor failed in his duties to ensure adequate
compaction. That failure severs liability.
The Andersons attempt to distinguish Smith v. Frandsen by highlighting some
minor factual differences. In Smith, the developer transferred the property to the buildercontractor, who negligently built the home on collapsible soils and failed to disclose the
soils problems. The plaintiffs sought recovery from the developer. The court denied this
cause of action, finding that the actions and failures of the builder-contractor interrupted
any failures by the developer and severed liability. The Andersons seek to distinguish
this remarkably similar situation by emphasizing that title to the property passed through
the builder-contractor.
persuasive.

However, this was not the fact which the Smith Court found

Rather it was "the knowledge and expertise of the builder, and the

independent duties owed thereby, [which] interrupt certain obligations running from the
initial developer to subsequent purchasers." Smith, 2004 UT 55, ^ 21. Thus, it was the
standard of care and the professional duties of the builder-contractor, and not the fact that
title passed through him, which interrupted liability to the developer.
This holding in Smith makes sense on other grounds. It does not make sense that a
contractual principle, i.e. privity of contract, would serve to interrupt tortious liability.
Rather, a plain reading of Smith shows that it was a tort principle, that of a breach of the
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duty of care by the builder-contractor, which operates to interrupt liability to the
developer. Id. Thus, both a plain reading of Smith v. Frandsen, as well as a clear
understanding of the legal principles upon which it was based, demonstrate that Smith
directly applies to the facts of this case.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals reached the correct conclusion in this case and determined
that Mr. Kriser was not liable for information he did not know, and had no duty to
disclose even if he had known it. Mr. Kriser was not the developer of the Andersons'
property, and knowledge cannot be imputed upon him. The failures of Norman Anderson
to properly construct the Andersons' home interrupt liability to any other party. The
decision of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
DATED and SIGNED this / / ^ y of May, 2010.
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-23-

}^M^

/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the original Brief of the Respondent Matthew Kriser, together
with required copies, was hand delivered to the Clerk of the Court, in the Utah Supreme
Court and two copies mailed to the below named parties by placing the same in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, this if"'

Stephen Quesenberry
Charles L. Perschon
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, L.C.
Riverview Plaza, Ste. 300
4844 North 300 West
Provo, Utah, 84604

-24-

day of May, 2010, addressed as follows:

